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The following article is based on a paper delivered at the National Conference on Wrongful
Convictions and the Death Penalty, held at
Northwestern University Law School in
November. At deadline time the complete version was in press for 61 Law & Contemporary
Problems (1998).

One of the longstanding complaints
against the death penalty is that it
"distort[s] the course of the criminal
law." Capital prosecutions are
expensive and complicated; they draw
sensational attention from the press;
they are litigated - before, during and
after trial - at greater length and
depth than other felonies; they
generate more intense emotions, for
and against; they last longer and live in
memory. There is no dispute about
these effects, only about their
significance. To opponents of the death
penalty, they range from minor to
severe faults; to proponents, from
tolerable costs to major virtues. Until
recently, however, the conviction of
innocent defendants was not seen as a
special hazard of capital punishment.
Everybody agreed, of course, that
condemning innocent defendants is a
singular wrong, but it was not widely
viewed as a major problem, and
certainly not as a problem of special
significance for capital cases. In the
past decade this complacent view has
been shattered.

In case after case, erroneous conviction
for capital murder has been proven. I
contend that these are not disconnected
accidents, but systematic consequences of
the nature of homicide prosecution in
general and capital prosecution in
particular - that in this respect, as in
others, death distorts and undermines the
course of the law:
There are three factual claims behind
the argument that capital convictions of
innocent defendants are very rare.
(1) Erroneous convictions are rare in
criminal prosecutions of any sort, and their
danger is greatly exaggerated. Judge
Learned Hand captured this sentiment in
his frequently quoted observation: "Under
our criminal procedure the accused has
every advantage .... He is immune from
question or comment on his silence; he
cannot be convicted when there is the least
fair doubt in the minds of any one of the
twelve .... Our dangers do not lie in too
little tenderness to the accused. Our
procedure has been always haunted by the
ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is
an unreal dream. What we need to fear is
the archaic formalism and the watery
sentiment that obstructs, delays, and
defeats the prosecution of crime."
(2) On the whole, homicides are easier
to solve than most other violent felonies.
Homicide is typically a crime of passion
rather than design, and the killer is usually
a relative, friend or acquaintance of the
victim. For example, in 1994, about 78
percent of robberies and 52 percent of
aggravated assaults in the United States
were committed by strangers, compared
vvith only about 25 percent of homicides.
As a result, most homicides present no real
question about the identity of the criminal,
and no real risk of mistake.
(3) Homicides, and capital homicides in
particular, get far more attention than other
crimes. This suggests that errors will be less
likely in these cases because they are
examined ,vi.th much more care than
others. For example, Frank Canington
wrote in 1978: "[O]ur legal system
examines capital convictions with such an
intense scrutiny that ... when there is the
slightest doubt of guilt (even after
conviction), a commutation ,vill usually
result, or the individual will otherwise be

spared, thus lessening the chance of
executing the innocent."
In other words, we need not worry
about this problem because we have
already taken care of it.
How convincing are these three
premises? The strong version of the first Judge Hands position that convictions of
innocent people just don't happen - is
false. In 1932, Edwin Borchard responded
to the claim that "innocent men are never
convicted" by publishing his now classic
book, Convicting The Innocent, in which
he documented 65 of these cases that
never happen. Since then, several other
compilations of proven erroneous
convictions have been published, and new
cases continue to surface with regularity:
Nobody knows the true number of
mistaken convictions. Since 1992 at least
53 defendants - mostly convicted rapists
- have been exonerated by DNA
identification evidence; most of them were
released after spending years in prison.
These were flukes. The technology to prove
their innocence happened to become
available before the physical evidence from
the crime (semen or blood) was lost or
destroyed, or deteriorated beyond use. It's
anybodys guess how many other innocent
prisoners haven't had the benefit of this
sort of luck. The erroneous convictions that
are discovered may truly be the tip of an
iceberg.
Still, the vast majority of convicted
defendants are no doubt guilty; the iceberg
- whatever its size - floats in a sea of
factually correct decisions. Learned Hands
view is simply an example of a common
human tendency to assimilate "usually" to
"always," and "rarely" to "never." This can
be dangerous. Airplane crashes (or, to
continue a conceit, collisions between
ocean liners and icebergs) are also rare; as
passengers, we can feel comfortable telling
ourselves and each other not to worry, that
it vvill never happen. But engineers, traffic
controllers and pilots must not ignore
crashes. These are tenible, tragic events,
and they remain rare precisely because as a
society we do worry about them, and try to
stop them from ever happening.
The second point - that in most
homicides there is no serious factual
question about the guilt of the accused LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES SPRING

1999 83

I am concerned with any wrongful conviction of a defendant charged with a capital crime, regardless of the crime
or the penalty. The worst mistake, the execution of an innocent defendant, appears to be the rarest. This is what
we ought to expect: Guilty or innocent, few of those who are sentenced to death in America are actually executed.
is true. That reduces the field considerably.
Unfortunately, the ease ,vi.th which most
homicides may be solved does relatively
little to increase the accuracy of decisionmaking in capital homicide cases, since
that subset is likely to include most of Lhe
cases in which factual determinations are
most difficult. In most homicides the killer
,vas known to the victim; that is the main
fact that makes most homicides easy to
solve. But not capital murders. For
example, a study of homicide prosecutions
from 1976 through 1980 in Georgia,
Florida, and Illinois found that while only
17 percent to 22 percent of all the
homicide victims in those states were killed
by strangers, 55 percent to 71 percent of
the death sentences were returned in this
comparatively rare set of cases.
The third step in the argument - that
capital cases get an extraordinary amount
of attention - is also certainly true. But for
the purpose of minimizing the risk of
erroneous convictions and executions that
attention is a tvvo edged sword at best: It
generates many more mistakes than we
would see if capital murders were handled
as casually as run-of-the-mill robbe1ies and
assaults. The extra attention we devote to
capital cases might also help us catch some
or even most of these mistakes, to the
extent that vve are committed to doing so.
Unfortunately, recent history suggests that
our commitment to correcting deadly
judicial errors is weak.
The last paragraph must seem very
puzzling: Why would added attention
increase errors 1 And yet, that non-intuitive
statement is the core of my argument. I will
develop it later, after defining my terms
and offering a brief discussion of the large
volume of evidence that has accumulated
that mistaken convictions in capital cases
do occur on a regular basis. Finally, I will
review what we might do and what we in
fact do to minimize these tragedies.

I. Defining the issues.
The archetypal capital case is a highly
publicized prosecution for a brutal and
gory murder, in which the defendant is
tried, convicted, sentenced to death, and
eventually executed. Needless to say, most
capital cases differ from this standard in
84
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one or several respects. The case may
receive relatively little publicity; the murder
may be relatively low on the scale of
horror; the defendant may plead guilty
rather than go to trial, in 'Nhich case he
will normally be sentenced to life
imprisonment or a term of years; if he does
go to trial he may be convicted of a noncapital crime, or acquitted altogether; if he
is convicted of a capital ciime, he may be
sentenced to life imp1isonment; and finally;
if he is sentenced to death, he will
probably never be executed.
I am concerned with any wrongful
conviction of a defendant charged vvith a
capital crime, regardless of the ciime or the
penalty The worst mistake, the execution
of an innocent defendant, appears to be the
rarest. This is what we ought to expect:
Guilty or innocent, few of those who are
sentenced to death in America are actually
executed. Among the known cases of
wrongful conviction, many more innocent
defendants were either convicted of first
degree murder and sentenced to death but
not executed, or convicted of first degree
murder and sentenced to life imp1isonment;
much smaller groups were convicted of
second degree murder, or even manslaughter or lesser felonies, and sentenced
to terms of years.
A conviction can be "wrong" in many
ways. It might be excessive - for example,
if the defendant is really guilty of second
degree murder but was convicted of first
degree murder; or the jury might have
been right to conclude that the defendant
committed the fatal act, but wrong to reject
a defense of insanity or self-defense; or a
conviction that is factually accurate might
have been obtained in violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights. I'm not
concerned with any of these types of
errors. I shall limit my focus to convictions
of "the wrong person," a defendant who
did not do the act that caused the death or
deaths for which he was convicted.
Erroneous convictions (as I have defined
them) may occur disproportionately often
in capital cases for two types of reasons:
(1) because of factors that are common or
inevitable in capital prosecutions, but that
occur in other cases as well - for instance,
the fact that the crime involves homicide,
or that it was heavily publicized; or
(2) because of consequences that ilow from

the demand for the death penalty itself
Some factors may appear in both groups.
For example, a capital case is likely to be
the sort of case that would be highly
publicized in any event, and asking for the
death penalty is likely to make it more so.
If capital cases do produce erroneous
convictions, there are different implications
depending on the cause of the erroneous
conviction. The causes in the first group
imply that we should be wary of imposing
or executing death sentences, because
capital cases are of the sort where
erroneous convictions are particularly
likely regardless of the sanction requested
or imposed. Abolishing the death penalty
would not reduce the number of erroneous
convictions of that type, but rather would
eliminate the worst consequences of those
errors. The causes in the second group
imply that the death penalty itself
undermines the accuracy of our system of
adjudication. As Justice Frankfurter put it:
"When life is at hazard in a trial, it
sensationalizes the whole thing almost
unwittingly The effect ... [is] very bad." If
that's true, abolishing capital punishment
would reduce the number of erroneous
convictions of all sorts in those cases in
which we now seek the death penalty; and
not merely limit the harm of those errors
that do occur.

II. How often are innocent people
sentenced to death?
It's anybody's guess how many of the
3,365 p1isoners on death row are innocent
of the murders for which they were
condemned. But we are beginning to be
able to place a lower bound on how few it
may be, and it's quite a few. The major
work in this area is a study of wrongful
convictions in "potentially capital cases" by
Professors Hugo Bedau and Michael
Radelet. The first published version of this
work appeared in 1987; it listed 350 such
wrongful convictions from 1900 through
1985, including 139 death sentences and
29 executions. In 1992 Professors Bedau
and Radelet, together with Constance
Putnam, published their findings in the
book In Spite of Innocence. By then the
catalogue had been extended to 416

miscaniages of justice, from 1900 through
1990. Some of the cases on their list are
notorious and controversial, including
several of the executions: Bruno
Hauptmann, Joe Hill, Nicola Sacco and
Bartolomeo Vanzetti. For these cases, there
are other writers who maintain that the
defendant was in fact guilty. But the
precision of Bedau and Radelets judgment
in every case hardly matters; its the overall
pattern that tells the story. In the great
majority of their cases the error has been
admitted or is beyond dispute. And even
the disputed cases suggest that there are
severe doubts about the defendants' guilt
- which in tum means that many of them
were innocent. On the other side, Bedau
and Radelet excluded cases in which the
defendants may well have been innocent,
if, in their judgment, the evidence of
innocence was not sufficiently convincing.
In any event, a compilation such as this
can only be a list of illustrations of the
problem, not a catalogue of errors. As
Bedau and Radelet readily admit, nobody
knows how many miscarriages of justice
have gone entirely undetected.
In 1996, Professors Radelet and Bedau
and William Lofquist published a third
study on this issue: a compilation of cases
of prisoners who were released from death
row since 1970 because of serious doubts
about their guilt. They list 69 such cases,
about 1.2 percent of the total number of
death sentences returned between the end
of 1972 and the beginning of 1998. As the
authors point out, their definition of the
category - "serious doubts about guilt" includes some death row inmates who
were ultimately acquitted, or whose cases
were dismissed, but who may in fact have
been guilty. Nonetheless, it is almost
certainly an undercount of the number of
defendants erroneously convicted and sent
to death row, for several reasons: (1) In
some of these cases - the most tragic the error will never be discovered and the
defendant will be executed or die in prison
of other causes. (2) In others the error will
probably never be discovered because it
has become moot. The published list does
not include any case in which a defendant
who might well be innocent obtained
release on other grounds, such as a
constitutional violation, or the death or
absence of a witness. (3) In some cases

errors that will eventually be discovered are
not yet known. The average time to release
for the cases that Radelet and his colleagues
list is 7.34 years; the median time is
between six and seven years. The deathrow population in the United States has
been growing steadily for decades; as a
result, many prisoners on death row have
been there six years or less. (4) Some cases
in which innocent death row prisoners
have been released - perhaps most - are
not in the sample. Over a quarter of the
total number of cases (18/68) are from
Florida; California, which has the largest
death row in the country - 4 77 compared
to 389 in Florida - has only two cases;
and Texas, which has executed more
prisoners than any other state - 144
compared to 39 for Florida - has only six.
The reason for this disproportion, as the
authors point out, is that Professor Radelet
works in Florida and has maintained
detailed data on every capital prosecution
in the state. If there were comparable data
for all death penalty states, or if there was a
comprehensive registry of all death row
inmates released because of doubts about
guilt, the total of known cases would be
much higher. But these resources do not
exist.
The essential thing to know about
mistaken convictions in capital cases is that
they do happen and will continue to
happen with some regularity - as Bedau
and Radelet have shO\vn. Bedau and
Radelet do not try to estimate how often
these tragic mistakes occur, and neither
will I. Instead, I will address a related issue:
Why do they happen in death penalty
cases?
At the outset, however, it may be useful
to put the numbers I have provided in
perspective. Bedau and Radelet have
assembled information on more erroneous
convictions in capital cases in Ame1ica in
this century than all other collections of
such errors in all criminal cases combined.
Since then, similar errors keep coming to
light. In 1988, Arye Rattner published the
most comprehensive summary of
information on known miscarriages of
justice in America, regardless of crime or
cause - 205 erroneous convictions, from
1900 on. In 45 percent of Rattners cases
the offense was murder, and in 12 percent
the penalty was death. By compaiison,

homicides (of all sorts) make up a fraction
of 1 percent of all arrests in this country,
and about 3 percent of arrests for crimes of
violence. Murder and non-negligent
homicide account for 1.3 percent of all
criminal convictions, about 7 percent of
convictions for violent crimes, less than 3
percent of all commitments to prison, and
about 10 percent of commitments to
prison for crimes of violence. Death
sentences account for about 2 percent of all
murder convictions, less than two-tenths of
1 percent of all convictions for violent
crimes, and perhaps three hundredths of 1
percent of all criminal convictions. In other
words, capital cases are heavily overrepresented among known miscarriages of
justice - 5 to 1 or 10 to 1 or 100 to 1 or
more, depending on which comparison
seems most telling.
Does this mean that miscarriages of
justice are more likely in capital cases than
other prosecutions? I think so, for reasons I
will e:xl)lain in the next section. But there is
also an obvious competing explanation for
this striking disproportion. Since we pay
more attention to homicides than to other
crimes, and more to capital cases than to
other homicides, we would be likely to
detect more errors among homicide
convictions than among other felonies and especially among the most aggravated
homicides - even if the errors that occur
were evenly distributed. In part, this
argument is certainly true. With more effort
we could discover more miscarriages of
justice, and we do devote more attention to
capital cases than to other felony
prosecutions. But it cannot be a complete
explanation for the apparent abundance of
errors in capital cases. Many of the known
miscarriages of justice - capital and noncapital alike - were discovered by sheer
chance. If chance were the only factor, the
known cases would be representative of all
errors; since its only one causal factor, the
sample is no doubt quite different from the
universe. Still, if even a third of the errors
surfaced by luck alone, it would be
surprising if the actual proportion of errors
in murder cases were over-represented in
the set of knO\-vn errors by as large a factor
as we see: five or ten or a hundred to one.
Ultimately, the comparative proportion
of miscarriages of justice in capital cases
does not matter. Its possible, I suppose,
LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES SPRING
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----------------------A. Investigation.
This is the ritical tage , here most
err rs o cur. The circumstanc s that
produ e th m are ariable , but th basi
ause is th same: Homicides and in
particular capital homicides, ar pursued
much more vigorously than other crimes.
As a result, m re guilty defendants are
identified and apprehended. Unfortunately,
along the wa , more innocent defendants
- a larger number and a higher
proportion - are caught up in the process
as well.

that err neous convictions are just as
common in other criminal cases. Its a
depressing thought. It implies that behind
the e ent some prisoners ho ha e been
released from death ro in recent years
be ause of doubts about their guilt there
are thou ands of undi co ered cases of
defendants with equall doubtful
onvictions for non-capital homicides, and
doz ns of thousands or more equally
qu stionable convictions for robbery,
burglary, and assault. But even if we
.
assum this unlikely equi al nee , the basic
problems would be the ame. Capital cases
are at least as error prone as any others
(if not much more so) and we regularly
sentence mnocent people to death. o the
underlymg question remains: Considering
all the aLLention e de ote to death penalty
cases, hy do we make so many mistakes?
THE

L

Ill. Why are innocent people
regularly sentenced to death?
The road to conviction and sentence has
three main stages: investigation, which is
primarily the province of police; pre-trial
screening and plea bargaining, where the
dominant actor is the prosecutor; and trial,
before a judge and jury At each stage,
capital cases receive more care, more
resources and more scrutiny than other
prosecutions. This special focus is a natural
consequence of the unique importance of
death - the deaths of the victims and the
prospect of death as punishment for the
defendants. In most cases, the effects of
this special treatment are beneficial. But
theres a cost: In some cases, the very same
process produces terrible, deadly errors.

1. Clearance rates.
Most crimes are never sol ed. In 1995 ,
a mere 21 percent of all serious crimes
known to the police were ' cleared" hich usually means that a suspect was
arrested; of serious violent crimes, 45
percent were cleared. Bute en these low
figures only tell half the story. Most crimes
are not "known to the police" - in 1995
only 36 percent of all crimes, and 42
percent of crimes of violence were
reported. In other words only about
18 percent of all crimes of violence are
solved by the police, including about
14 percent of robberies 18 percent of
rapes, and 7 percent of burglaries.
On the whole, the crimes that are
reported to the police have better evidence
than those that are not reported. Cases
with e tremely strong evidence - those in
which the culprit is caught in the act, or
seen and identified by se eral people are almost always reported . If the victim
has to take the initiative to notify the
police, he'll be more likely to do so if he
thinks there's a good chance that the
criminal will be caught. When the police
do hear about a robbery, or a rape, or a
burglary, for which the identity of the
criminal is not immediately obvious, their
investigation is usually perfunctory: Put out
a call to other officers to try to spot the
criminal in flight ; interview the witnesses at
the scene; collect immediately a ailable
physical evidence; thats it. If a suspect
doesn't emerge from this process it is
unlikely that the case will e er be
prosecuted. ost police detecti es do not
have the time to conduct detailed
in estigations of e ery reported felony, and

in the usual run-of-the-mill case there is
little pressure on them to do so. The net
result is that in general the felonies that are
prosecuted are likely to be those in which
the evidence of guilt is strongest.
Homicides are different. First, almost
every homicide is reported to the police
when the body of the deceased person is
found. Second, most homicides known to
the police are cleared - 65 percent in
1995, more in previous years. Overall, the
proportion of all homicides that are solved
is about four times higher than the
comparable proportion for other violent
crimes. A study of robbery investigations in
Chicago in 1982-83, by Franklin Zimring
and James Zuehl, provides an excellent
illustration: 13 percent of all robberies
reported to the police were solved within
two months (including a somewhat lower
proportion of robberies with injuries to the
victims), compared to 57 percent of
robbery killings. This difference cannot be
explained by supe1ior evidence - on the
contrary, robbery homicides will usually
have weaker evidence, since the victim is
dead - but must be due to a systematic
difference in the investigation by the police.
As we have noted, many homicides are
easy to investigate. In a typical case - a
killing by a friend as a result of a drunken
fighl - the killer is known from the start.
But the police get the hard murders as well
as the easy ones, and there is much more
pressure to solve these cases than nonhomicidal crimes. The relatives of the
victim care more, the prosecutor cares
more, the public is much more likely to be
concerned, and the police themselves care
more. Death produces strong reactions in this context, a desire to punish and to
protect. Other outrageous crimes can have
the same effect - kidnappings, for
" example, or serial rapes - but they are
rare. Homicide is common.
For the most part, the pressure to solve
homicides produces the intended results.
An investigation that would be closed
without arrest if it were a mere robber;
may end in a conviction if the robber killed
one of his victims. But that same pressure
can also produce mistakes. If the murder
cannot be readily solved, the police may be
tempted to cut comers, to jump to

conclusions, and - if they believe they
have the killer - perhaps to manufacture
evidence to clinch the case. The danger
that the investigators will go too far is
magnified to the extent that the killing is
brutal and horrifying, and to the extent
that it attracts public attention - factors
which also increase the likelihood that the
murder will be treated as a capital case.
The murder of 10-year-oldJeanine
Nicarico is a good example. In February
1983 she was abducted from her home in
Naperville, Illinois, raped and killed - a
crime of stunning brutality The murder
was the subject of a long, frustrating,
unsuccessful investigation - a humiliating
public failure. Thirteen months after the
murder - and less than two weeks before
the local prosecutor stood for reelection three men were indicted: Rolando Cruz,
Alejandro Hernandez and Stephen Buckley
Cruz and Hernandez were convicted and
sentenced to death; their convictions were
reversed by the Illinois Supreme Court.
They were convicted again, but this time
only Cruz was sentenced to death. Again
the convictions were reversed. Finally, at
Cruz's third trial - over 12 years after the
murder - the case fell apart when a police
officer admitted he had lied under oath,
and the judge entered a judgment of
acquittal. What seems to have happened is
this: Under intense pressure, the police
convinced themselves that they knew who
killed Jeanine Nicarico and they
manufactured evidence to convince
prosecutors and to use in court. If the
criminal had taken jewelry from the
Nicarico home rather than a child - or
even if he had knocked out a family
member or set the home on fire - there
would probably have been a minimal
investigation, no arrests, no trial, and no
erroneous convictions.
2. Evidence.
Most miscarriages of justice are caused
by eyewitness misidentifications. In Rattner's
sample of wTongful convictions, 52 percent
of the errors for vvhich the cause could be
determined were caused by misidentifications, and other researchers concur that
eyewitness error is by far the most
common cause of convictions of innocent
defendants. On the other hand, eyewitness

error was a factor in only 16 percent of
Bedau and Radelet's cases of errors in
potentially capital prosecutions - which
suggests that among the non-murder cases
in Rattner's sample, over 80 percent of the
errors were due to misidentifications.
No doubt the main reason for this
difference is the absence of a live victim in
most homicides. Victims provide crucial
identification evidence in most robberies
and rapes, and so they make most of the
mistakes, when mistakes are made. In the
absence of a victim the police may have no
eyewitness evidence, and therefore no
room for eyewitness error. This is hardly an
advantage for accuracy Many, perhaps
most eyewitness identifications of criminals
by strangers are accurate. Frequently they
are corroborated or lead to other evidence
that greatly reduces the likelihood of error
- fingerprints, stolen property, reliable
confessions, etc. In addition, for about half
of all violent crimes eyevvitness
identifications are extremely reliable
because the crimes were committed by
relatives, friends, or others who are known
to the victims. Murderers are even more
likely to be knmvn to their victims but that
may not help because, in the words of the
immortal cliche, "dead men don't talk."
Eyewitness identifications are also very
uncommon in burglary cases, but the
upshot is different. There are very few
erroneous convictions based on
misidentifications, but since there are also
few burglary prosecutions based on noneyewimess evidence, there are few errors of
any sort, and few convictions. The
clearance rate for reported burglaries is
only 13 percent. But killers must be
pursued, and in the absence of eyewitness
evidence, the police are forced to rely on
evidence from other sources: accomplices;
jail-house snitches and other underworld
figures; and confessions from the
defendants themselves. Not surprisingly,
perjury by a prosecution vvitness is the
leading cause of error in erroneous capital
convictions, and false confessions are the
third most common cause.
Pe1jury. From Macbeth to Mark Twain's
InjunJoe, the killer who blames his crime
on others is a familiar character in fiction.
Similar things happen in life. Some
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criminals implicate innocent defendants in
order to divert suspicion from themselves.
In other cases, false witnesses, who may
have had no role in the crime, lie for
money or for other favors. Both types of
motives are more powerful in homicides
than in other criminal cases, and especially
in capital homicides.
First, the threat of being caught is much
greater for a homicide than for almost any
other crime. Its no news that the police
work much harder to find killers than
burglars or robbers, and that their interest
increases in proportion to the brutality and
not01iety of the crime.
Second, if the culprit is suspected and
caught, he has more to fear in a capital
case: He might get executed. The threat of
death can be a powerful motivator when
its concrete. The death penalty as an
abstract prospect does not seem to deter
many homicides. Before the crime, the
killer - if he thinks at all - no doubt
expects to escape scot-free; he is not likely
to weigh the benefits of murder against the
costs of the possible punishment. After the
crime, however, there is more time to
think, and the fear of conviction and
execution may be vivid - especially if the
police seem to be closing in.
Third, a perjurious killer may have to
admit to crimes himself. He and the
innocent defendant may in fact have been
accomplices in some crime other than the
murder, or he might have been caught in
undeniably compromising circumstances,
or he might have to admit to some level of
guilt in order to make his accusation
credible. If so, the real killer has more to
gain in a capital case than under other
circumstances. If he has to go to prison,
the gain from cooperation is time vs. death,
as opposed to less time vs. more time. But
that may not be necessary: If he helps
break a capital case, he may walk.
Fourth, if the witness is lying to get
favors unrelated to the crime at issue, he'll
do much better if its a big case - which
usually means a murder, or better yet, a
capital murder. The typical witness in this
category is the jail-house snitch. For
example, in 1932 Gus Colin Langley was
convicted of first degree murder in North
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Carolina based in part on testimony from
his cellmate, who said that Langley had
confessed to him. Langley came within half
an hour of electrocution, but was
exonerated four years later and received a
full pardon. His cellmate didn't have to
wait that long; after his perjurious
testimony, unrelated charges against hi'tn
were dropped.
Fifth, its easier to lie about a capital case
than most other crimes of violence: theres
usually no live victim to contradict the false
witness.
The overall result seems to be that
witness perjury is a far more common
cause of error in murders and other capital
cases than in lesser crimes. Bedau and
Radelet identified it as a factor in 35 percent
of their erroneous capital convictions,
while Rattner lists perj.ury as the cause of
only 11 percent of his errors. But recall that
45 percent of Rattners cases are murders. If
perjury were as common among the
murder convictions in Rattners sample as
among Bedau and Radelets cases, then
erroneous murder convictions could easily
account for all the cases in which the error
was caused by perjury.
The case of Paris Carriger is a good
illustration of the role of perjury in capital
prosecutions. On March 14, 1978, Carriger
was arrested for the brutal robbery murder
of Robert Shaw, the owner of a jewelry
store, on the previous day The evidence
against Caniger was provided by Robert
Dunbar, a friend on whose property
Carriger was living in a trailer. Dunbar who had a great deal of experience as a
police informant - called the police and
said he could identify Shaws killer in
return for immunity from prosecution for
various felonies: another robbery he
committed two days earlier, possession of a
gun he had bought (which was illegal
because he was a convicted felon), and
attempting to dispose of the proceeds of
the Shaw robbery-murder. The police
agreed to these terms. Dunbar then told
them that Carriger had come to him,
confessed to the killing, and asked for help
in disposing of bloody clothes and stolen
jewelry; Dunbar corroborated the story by
producing some of the loot, and leading
the police to some of the clothes. Carriger

was convicted and sentenced to death
almost entirely on Dunbars testimony He
steadfastly maintained his innocence, and
claimed that Dunbar himself - a man
with a long history of violence and
deception - must have committed the
murder. After the trial, Dunbar, who was
soon jailed for other crimes, bragged that
he had framed Carriger. In 1987 he
confessed his own guilt to various people,
including his parents and a clergyman.
That same year he repeated his confession
in court, and admitted that he had lied at
Carrigers trial and that he had committed
the murder himself. Three weeks later he
retracted that confession, but admitted that
he was doing so for fear that he'd be
prosecuted for the murder and executed
himself. In 1991, shortly before he died in
prison, Dunbar confessed again, to his
cellmate. Dunbars ex-wife, who had
corroborated his original story and had
given him an alibi, testified in 1987 that
Dunbar had forced her to lie.
In December 1997, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals en bane ordered that
Carriger be retried or released. As of this
writing, he remains in custody awaiting
retrial. He came close to execution on
several occasions in the 20 years since his
arrest. Under the circumstances, a new trial
seems a modest goal, since, at a minimum,
the evidence that has turned up after nial
raises grave doubts about Carrigers guilt.
But if Robert Shaw hadn't been killed, none
of this would ever have happened. Dunbar
would probably never have approached the
police, they would hardly have given an
ex-felon immunity from prosecution for
three serious felonies in order to convict
spmeone else of a single robbery, and the
victim would have been available to
contradict a false story.
False confessions. A typical robbery
investigation is resolved by an eyewitness
identification; a typical homicide
investigation is resolved by a confession.
Many confessions are easy straight-forward
affairs - volunteered by suspects who are
overcome by guilt, or believe they have
nothing to lose. These are the easy cases,
where nothing has been clone that might
produce a false confession, and where
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more often than not there is strong
corroborating evidence of guilt. Some
confessions, however, are not so readily
given, but are instead the end products of
long, drawn out interrogations.
American police officers use all sorts of
coercive and manipulative methods to
obtain confessions. They confuse and
disorient the suspect; they lie to him about
physical evidence, about witnesses, about
statements by other suspects; they pretend
that they already have their case sealed and
are only giving the suspect a chance to
explain his side of the story; they pretend
to understand, to sympathize, to excuse;
they play on the suspect'.s fears, his biases,
his guilt, his loyalty to family and friends,
his religion; they exhaust the suspect and
wear him down; in some cases, they use
violence, even torture. These are powerful
techniques. They work to get confessions
from guilty defendants - and sometimes
from innocent defendants as well.
From the point of view of the police,
the main problem with interrogation is not
that it occasionally produces errors, but
that it'.s extremely time consuming. It's
likely to take hours, perhaps days to break
down a suspect who resists and insists on
his innocence. Frequently several police
officers cooperate in the effort, questioning
the suspect simultaneously or in relays. As
a result, extended interrogation is largely
reserved for big cases in which confessions
are necessary for successful prosecution.
Typically, that means homicides, and
especially the most heinous homicides, for
reasons I've mentioned: these are the cases
that the police are most anxious to solve,
and yet, because the victim is dead, they
frequently lack eyewitnesses.
As with perjury, false confessions are a
much more common cause of errors for
homicides than for other crimes. They
were a cause of 14 percent of Bedau and
Radelet's errors in homicide and capital
cases, but only 8 percent of the errors
reported by Rattner. Since 45 percent of
Rattner'.s cases are homicides, this suggests
that false confessions are three to four
times more common as a cause of
miscarriages of justice for homicide cases
than for other crimes.

The case of Melvin Reynolds is a good
example, but by no means unique. On
May 26, 1978, 4-year-old Eric Christgen
disappeared in downtown St. Joseph,
Missouri. His body later turned up along
the Missouri River; he had been sexually
abused and died of suffocation. The police
questioned over a hundred possible
suspects, including "every known pervert
in town," to no avail. One of them was
Melvin Reynolds, a 25-year-old man of
limited intelligence who had been sexually
abused himself as a child and who had
some homosexual episodes as an
adolescent. Reynolds, although extremely
agitated by the investigation, cooperated
through several interrogations over a
period of months, including two polygraph
examinations and one interrogation under
hypnosis. In December 1978 he was
questioned under sodium amytal ("truth
serum") and made an ambiguous remark
that intensified police suspicion. Two
months later, in February 1979, the police
brought the still cooperative Reynolds in
for another round of interrogation - 14
hours of questions, promises and threats.
Finally, Reynolds gave in and said, 'TU say
so if you want me to." In the weeks that
followed, Reynolds embellished this
confession with details that were fed to
him, deliberately or otherwise. That was
enough to convince the prosecutor to
charge Reynolds, and to convince a jury to
convict him of second degree murder. He
was sentenced to life imprisonment. Four
years later, Reynolds was released when
another man - Charles Hatcher confessed to three murders, including that
of Elie Christgen.

B. Pre-Trial Screening
Most prosecutions are resolved without
nial. Eighty to 90 percent of convictions
result from guilty pleas, usually after plea
bargains, and at least 80 percent of
defendants who are not convicted obtain
pre-tiial dismissals rather than acquittals.
In other words, most of the work of sorting
criminal cases after arrest is done pre-trial,
by the exercise of prosecutorial discretion
to dismiss, to reduce charges, or to
recommend or agree to a particular
sentence. This pre-trial screening is
undoubtedly less important than the initial

police investigation, but it has more impact
on the accuracy of criminal dispositions
than anything that happens later on. If the
wrong person has been arrested, this is
where the mistake is most likely to be
caught. But in capital cases the value of
that screening is undermined, in part by
the effect of the threat of the death penalty,
and in part by the attention and pressure
that capital cases generate. As a result, there
is a danger of two distinct types of errors.
1. Guilty pleas by innocent defendants.
Threat is an essential part of all plea
bargaining: Take the deal or you'll do
worse after conviction. There is,
undeniably, a coercive aspect to this
bargain - the defendant must risk a severe
penalty in order to exercise his right to trial
- and plea bargaining has been strongly
criticized on that ground. One attack is
that the threat is so effective that it drives
some innocent defendants to plead guilty
along with the mass of guilty ones. That
may happen with some regularity for
innocent defendants who are offered very
light deals: time-served, diversion, six
months unsupervised probation, and so
forth. But among the more se1ious criminal
convictions with severe penalties of
imprisonment or death - those
convictions that show up in cases of
proven miscarriages of justice - the
picture is different. I have located exactly
one reported miscarriage of justice based
on a guilty plea for a non-homicidal crime
- and that was a peculiar case, a
defendant who pled guilty to a crime he
did not commit along with one which he
did commit. The available collections of
known errors are hardly representative
samples of the universe of erroneous
convictions, and errors based on guilty
pleas are undoubtedly less likely to be
discovered than those based on trials. Even
so, this is a stark contrast to the
overwhelming proportion of all convictions
that are based on guilty pleas.
Judging from the available evidence,
innocent defendants rarely plead guilty
when doing so entails a substantial tenn of
imprisonment, except in capital
prosecutions. Radelet, Bedau and Putnam
list 16 cases of innocent homicide
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defendants who pled guilty; in most, fear
of execution is given explicitly as the
reason for the plea. This is, no doubt,
another illustration of how death is
different. It seems that innocent defendants
will almost always risk additional years of
their lives in order to seek vindication
rather than accept disgrace coupled with a
long term of imprisonment, but some will
not go so far as to risk death.
The case of John Sosnovske is a good
example. In 1990, he was falsely
implicated in the rape murder of Taunja
Bennett by his girl friend, Laverne Pavlinac,
who apparently was afraid of him and
anxious to be rid of him. In the process,
Pavlinac became entangled in her own lies,
and claimed to have participated in the
killing. Both were charged with murder.
Pavlinac recanted her confession but was
convicted and sentenced to life in prison.
Following her conviction, Sosnovske who was facing the death penalty - pled
no contest and was also sentenced to life
imprisonment. Both were freed in 1995
after another man, Keith Hunter Jesperson,
confessed and also pled guilty to the same
murder.
2. Failure to dismiss false charges.
The major filter that may prevent a
charge based on questionable evidence
from turning into a conviction is
prosecutorial discretion to dismiss. Overall,
dismissals of felony charges outnumber
acquittals about 4 to 1. Many cases are
dismissed because of weak evidence
despite the fact that the prosecutor is
convinced that the defendant is guilty;
other cases are dismissed because the
prosecutor is convinced of the defendants
innocence, or has at least come to doubt
his guilt. For homicides, and especially
capital homicides, both sorts of dismissals
are less likely. In both situations, the major
reason is the same: We devote more
attention and more resources to criminal
cases when death is at stake.
Trials are time consuming and
expensive; they are a scarce resource. Since
most cases cannot be tried, it is obviously
sensible for a prosecutor to try to restrict
trials to cases where the outcomes will be
useful - i.e., convictions. If possible, a
likely loss at trial will be avoided through
generous plea bargaining; if not, the case
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may be dismissed even if the prosecutor is
convinced of the defendant's guilt. Regardless of their belief in the defendants' guilt,
prosecutors focus on the easiest cases first
- the ones with the best evidence - since
those are the cases where their limited
resources will have the greatest impact.
But homicides are different. Homicides
(and other notorious crimes) are the cases
for which resources are conserved. A dead
loser will still be dismissed, 1but what if its
merely likely that the defendant will be
acquitted? If its a robbery, the prosecutor
may dump the case and try another; if its a
murder, shes more likely to forge ahead.
Prosecutors lose a much higher
proportion of murder trials than other
felony trials, about 30 percent vs. about 15
percent. As Robert Scott and William
Stuntz point out, the most likely
explanation is that in murder cases they are
willing to go to trial with comparatively
weak evidence. The main effect of this
extra effort is that guilty defendants are
convicted who otherwise would never be
tried. But in some cases the evidence is
weak because the defendants are not guilty,
and some of those innocent defendants are
not only tried but convicted. In other
words (as ,vith police investigations), as
prosecutors work to obtain convictions in
hard homicide cases they draw in cases
where its difficult to separate the innocent
from the guilty.
Prosecutors also dismiss charges ih
some cases because they believe the
defendant may be innocent, regardless of
the evidence that is available to obtain a
conviction. The rules of professional
responsibility allow a prosecutor to
consider her own view of the defendants
guilt in deciding whether to charge, but do
not require her to do so. Prosecutors have
widely varying views on how to apply this
vague standard, from those who say that
they will never prosecute unless they
themselves are convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt of the defendants guilt,
to those who believe that regardless of their
own uncertainty, their task is to make a
case and let the jury decide. But this is
always a discretionary choice, and
whatever the prosecutors position in the
abstract, an actual decision to dismiss a
serious charge that would probably have
resulted in a conviction is always difficult.

It is bound to be much more difficult and unlikely - if the crime has attracted a
lot of attention, or if a victim, or several,
were killed.
The problem is not just public pressure.
Evidence of a defendants innocence does
not arrive on the prosecutors door step on
its own. If the police didn't find it at an
earlier stage, it is usually presented by the
defendants attorneys. Everybody agrees
that innocent defendants should not be
charged or convicted; the trouble is
identifying the cases in which that applies.
If there happens to be overwhelming
independent evidence of innocence, there
is no problem. But if the evidence of the
defendants innocence is not so clear, or if
its significance is not obvious, the
defendants fate may hinge on the
prosecutor's willingness to listen with an
open mind. The more notorious the case,
the more difficult that may be. Prosecutors,
like the rest of us, have a harder time
recognizing an error the more publicly they
have endorsed it, and the more time and
money and prestige they have committed
to it.
A prosecutor can always discount the
defense attorneys claim that her client is
innocent: This is hardly a non-partisan
source. An attorney for an innocent
defendant must overcome this handicap in
any case; in capital cases it may be
insurmountable. In an ordinary criminal
case, most pre-trial contact between the
prosecutor and the defense attorney takes
place in the context of plea bargaining. But
in many capital cases - especially those
most likely to produce death sentences there is no plea bargaining. The prosecutor
knows from the start that she will insist on
the death penalty, so there is nothing to
bargain over. In the absence of plea
bargaining, there will be fewer open
channels of communication between the
defense and the prosecution, so it may be
harder for the defense attorney to get a
serious hearing. Worse, in that context, the
true value of a claim of innocence becomes
harder to interpret. When plea bargaining
is an option, a defense lawyer is not likely
to commit her credibility to the argument
"He didn't do it" unless the lawyer believes
that its true, since (quite apart from
possible effects on her reputation) taking
that position will undermine her ability to

----------------------bargain convincingly for a lenient deal.
h n no deal is possible , arguing that the
client is innocent may be the only pre-trial
m ve a ailable. As far as this client is
oncerned, there may be nothing to lose by
making it, and, since the clients life is at
stak , the defense attorney may be driven
t make the claim whether she believes it
r not. More important, the prosecutor
knows that the defense attorney may feel
obliged to argue that the defendant is
mnocent, whether or not she thinks its
tru . As a result, when inflexible lines are
drawn at the start - which is particularly
likely in a capital prosecution of a heinous,
gruesome and highly publicized murder the defense attorney is less likely to be able
to convince the prosecutor of anything,
true or false , and especially not that the
client has been wrongly accused.

C. Trial
An innocent defendant who goes to trial
faces a high risk of conviction. The best
generalization about juries in criminal cases
is that they usually convict. To be sure , the
great majority of defendants should be
convi ted. The question is: Can juries
accurately sort the innocent from the
guilty? Or, to put it in conte t, how often
do juries spot innocent defendants that the
prosecutors have missed? Unfortunately,
juries approach this task with two severe
handicaps: They ha e less information than
the prosecutors or the police and the
have essentially no experience. Gi en these
limitations, it is unrealistic to expect juri s
to systematically correct errors in the
earlier decisions to investigate , to arrest and
to pr secute.
This is bad news for h micide
defendants. hether its because
prose utors take weaker cases to trial or
because they insist on the maximum
penalty, homicid d f ndants are mor
likely to face juries than ther c1iminal
defendants. Fore ampl , in 1988, 33
percent of murder cases in the 75 largest
counties in the United tates v ent to trial,
compared to 5 percent of all f lony
prosecutions and 9 per ent fall violent
felonies . In 1994, 15 percent of robbe1-y
convictions across the oumry were
obtained at trials, of which 1 percent were
jury trials, while 4 2 percent of murder
convictions were after trial, including 35

percent that went to jury uial. In other
words, since pre-trial sorting does less to
winno homicide cases than other
prosecutions, homicide defendants are more
likely to face the chancy ordeal of trial.
I don't mean to sa that the in titution
of trial by jury does not help redu e the
incidence of erron ous convictions. It no
doubt does fill that function but by brute
force : by making it more difficult for the
prose ution to obtain any convictions, and
b dis ouraging trials of the guilty and the
innocent alike unless the viden of guilt
is very strong. Th main benefit of this
process is that f db k from c urt may
impro e pre-trial in stigations and
increas sele tivit in barging - the
stages f the pr e s we ha e already
di cuss d. If all arks ell, the result is
that fe inn em defendants are br ught
to trial, m st d ·f ndants who are convicted
are guilty, and most who are a quitt d are
also guilty. And yet, if an innocent
defendant is tri d , he will probably be
convicted.
Gi en this structure, trial plays a

comparatively minor role in the production
of errors in capital cases. To the e tent that
jury behavior at trial does matter, the
question is: Do juries behave differently in
homicide trials in general, and in capital
homicides in particular, than in other
criminal trials? There are several reasons to
think that juries treat homicides and capital
cases differently than other criminal cas s,
and m st of them point in the dire tion of
a higher likelihood of onviction.
1. Factor that increa e the likelihood

of conviction.
Publicity. Most crim s, e en most
homi id s, receive ve1-y littl attention from
the m dia. A f w crimes, h
ver are
heavil publi ized.
ny, p rhaps most of
thes notorious crimes re h mi ides, and
p ially the unusu 1 nd h inous
homicid that are most lik ly to b
charged as capital rim . In those as
most jurors will ha e h rd all orts f
things bout the ca e b fore th g t t
urt , many f them in dmissible ,
misl ading, and inflammatory. Th , may
L AW
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have seen or heard or read that police
officers or other government officials have
declared the defendant guilty. They may
have witnessed or felt a general sense of
communal outrage. All this will make them
more likely to convict. Courts may attempt
to mitigate the impact of pre-trial publicity
by various means - most effectively by
changing the location of the trial - or they
may refuse to do so. Not surprisingly, the
records of erroneous convictions include
scores of cases in which publicity and
public outrage clearly contributed to the
error - from the convictions of Leo Frank
in 1913 and the Scottsboro Boys in 1931,
to the convictions of Rolando Cruz and
Alejandro Hernandez in 1985.
Death Qualification. In capital cases,
juries decide the sentence as well as
determine guilt or innocence. To
accommodate this function, the capital jury
selection process includes a unique
procedure, "death qualification," that is
designed to ensure that the jury is qualified
for the sentencing phase. Most jurors who
are strongly opposed to the death penalty,
and some who are strongly in favor, are
excluded at the outset. Many studies have
shown that these exclusions produce juries
that are more likely to convict. In addition,
the process of questioning jurors about
their willingness to impose the death
penalty before the trial on guilt or
innocence has begun, tends to create the
impression that guilt is a foregone
conclusion, and the only real issue is
punishment.
Fear of Death. In a capital case, avoiding
execution can become the overriding
imperative for the defense. In extreme
cases, fear of death drives innocent
defendants to plead guilty in return for a
lesser sentence, even life imprisonment. If
the defendant does not plead guilty, either
because no plea bargain is offered or
because he was unwilling to take it, the
same pressure will be felt at trial. Fear of a
death sentence may drive the defense to
make tactical choices that compromise its
position on guilt in order to improve the
odds on penalty; in some cases, the defense
may virtually concede guilt and focus
entirely on punishment; it will certainly
distract the defense from the issue of guilt
92
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and force it to spread its resources more
thinly. This distraction might increase the
chances of conviction even for those capital
defendants who are represented by skillful
lawyers vvith adequate resources; it vvill be
far more damaging for the many capital
defendants whose defense is shamefully
inadequate.
Heinousness. In theory, Jurors are
supposed to separate their decision on the
defendants guilt from their reaction to the
heinousness of his conduct: If the evidence
is insufficient, they should be just as
willing to acquit a serial murderer as a
shoplifter. Nobody believes this. Even in
civil trials, where the jury is asked to
decide cases by a preponderance of the
evidence, there are indications that juries
(and judges) are more likely to find
defendants liable, on identical evidence, as
the harm to the plaintiff increases. In
criminal trials the problem is worse, since
the burden of persuasion is proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. In a close criminal case
the jury is supposed to release a defendant
who is, in their opinion, probably guilty.
This is a distasteful task under any
circumstances, but it becomes increasingly
unpalatable - and unlikely - as we move
up the scale from non-violent crime, to
violent crime, to homicide, to aggravated
grisly murder.
2. Factors that decrease the likelihood
of conviction.
Quality of Defense. Capital defendants,
and to some extent homicide defendants in
general, may be better represented than
other criminal defendants. The attorneys
who are appointed to represent them may
be more experienced and skillful, and their
defenders may have more resources at their
disposal. Other things being equal, higher
quality representation will decrease the
likelihood of conviction, and may operate
as a check on errors and misconduct that
drive some innocent capital defendants to
trial and to conviction.
Severity of the Penalty. Prosecutors,
defense attorneys, and judges widely
believe that some jurors are more reluctant
to convict a defendant who might be
executed than one who faces a less extreme
punishment. In Adams v. Texas (448 U.S.

38 [1980]), the United States Supreme
Court acknowledged this possibility and
held that a juror could not automatically be
excluded from service because of this
reaction. To the extent that jurors do feel
this way, they may be less likely to convict
in capital trials than in other homicides.
3. Net effects.
When there are forces that push in one
direction and forces that push in the other,
it is sometimes possible to say that they
cancel out. Not here. The effects I have
described are extremely variable. Publicity,
death qualification, the heinousness of a
homicide - each of these may make a
critical difference in a particular case, or it
may not. On the other side, the protective
features of capital trials are uneven at best.
Many capital defendants do not have
quality representation, by any standard.
And the anxiety that jurors may feel when
a defendants Hfe is at stake will be relieved
if a jury decides (as they may do in
deliberations on guilt) that he will not be
sentenced to death. With that out of the
way, the competing impulse - to not free
a man who has killed - may take over, in
force.
I once saw a cartoon of two men in
black robes, obviously judges, talking in a
hall. One says, "Some days I'm feeling good
and everyone gets probation, and some
days I get up on the wrong side of bed and
I throw the book at everybody. It all
balances out." In statistical terms, the
problem is increased variance: Since
nobody gets the average punishment, the
more the judges sentences are spread out
arbitra1ily, the more of them are errors and errors on one side don't balance out
errors on the other. The same is true of
decisions on guilt and innocence: Mistakes
in one direction in some cases do not
balance mistakes in the opposite direction
in other cases. In capital trials, one
particular type of mistake - conviction of
an innocent defendant - is overwhelmingly important, and the fact that other,
guilty defendants get the benefit of other
errors is no help. If you're building a
seawall, adding height to one part won't
make up for cutting away at another.

----------------------IV. Conclusion: catching errors.
The basic conclusion is simple. The
steady stream of errors that we see in cases
in which defendants are sentenced to death
is a predictable consequence of our system
of investigating and prosecuting capital
murder. And behind those cases, there is
no doubt a larger group of erroneous
convictions in capital cases in which
defendants are not sentenced to death. But
what about what happens after trial?
Everybody knows that direct and collateral
review are more painstaking for capital
cases than for any others. Isn t it likely that
all these mistakes are caught and corrected
somewhere in that exacting process? The
answer, I'm afraid is , No. At best, we could
do an imperfect job of catching errors after
they occur and in many cases we don't
really try As a result, most miscarriages of
justice in capital cases never come to light.
Probably the best wa to figure out how
to catch miscarriages of justice is to look at
the cases in which we have done so.
Judging from the cases that are reported ,
three factors , separately or in combination,
are usually responsible for an innocent
defendants e oneration: Attention
Confession and Luck.
Attention. If a defendant is sentenced to
death he may well get more careful and
attenti e consideration from the courts on
review. More important, he is likely to be
better represented on direct appeal than he
would be otherwise, and he is likely to
ha e counsel on the post-appellate
collateral review, while most defendants
have none . These advantages may explain
in part the high proportion of death
sentences among known miscarriages of
justice. But a comparati e ad antage i not
a panacea. Man death row inmate ha e
inadequate r presentation at e ery level of
review, and some ha e no legal assistance
whate er for collateral review. And many
capital defendants who are convicted in
enor are not sentenced to death, ery likel
most. They do not recei e any special
attention from th ir attorneys or fr m the
courts· on the contrary, they might suffer
from the per eption that they' alread
recei ed the benefit of v hat er doubLs
their cas s may rais . hen alLer
L

UAD

LE

PR!

19

9

When an erroneous conviction is discovered and the mistake is proven beyond doubt, we know
what to do: stop the execution, release the prisoner. If there were some general method for identifying mistakes,
we wouldn't have this problem in the first place. But of course, there isn't. Instead, the errors
that we have discovered advertise the existence of others that we've missed.
McMillian was released after six years on
death row for a murder for which he had
been framed by local enforcement officials,
his attorney said that "only the death
sentence had allowed Mr. McMillian to
receive adequate representation, which
eventually uncovered the plot against him."
In truth, McMillian's post-conviction
representation was not adequate, it was
extraordinary. If he had merely been
sentenced to life imprisonment, he may
never have been heard from again, but the
death sentence he in fact received did not
guarantee exculpation, it just bought him
a chance.
Confessions. In most cases in which
miscarriages of justice are uncovered, the
real criminal confesses to the crime. In the
common scenario, the true murderer is
arrested and imprisoned for another crime
- sometimes a similar homicide - and
confesses before trial or in prison. For
example, Melvin Reynolds confessed
falsely, under intense pressure, to the rapemurder of a 4-year-old boy; he was
released when Charles Hatcher was
arrested and confessed to three murders,
including the one for which Reynolds was
imprisoned. Similarly; John Sosnovske and
Laverne Pavlinac were both freed in 1995
after Keith Jesperson confessed to the murder
for which they were falsely convicted.
Luck. Getting a confession from the real
killer is the common stroke of luck in cases
in which a miscarriage of justice is caught.
But sometimes luck takes a different route.
The break in Randall Dale Adams' case
came when documentary film maker Errol
Morris ran into Adams by chance in 1985
when Morris was doing research on
psychiatric testimony in Texas capital
prosecutions. Morris went on to produce a
movie about Adams' case, The Thin Blue
Line, which was released in 1988; the
movie drew national attention to the case
and resulted in Adams' release in 1989, 12
years after he had been sentenced to death.
The basic cause for the comparatively
large number of errors in capital cases is a
natural and laudable human impulse: We
want murderers to be caught and
punished. Sometimes that impulse drives
police and prosecutors to lie and cheat, but
usually it simply motivates them to work
harder to catch killers and to convict them.
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It works: More cases are cleared, more
murderers are convicted. But harder cases
are more likely to produce mistakes - still
exceptions, no doubt, but not as rare as for
other crimes, where the cases that are
prosecuted are mostly skimmed off the top.
Perhaps the worst mistake we might make
in this connection is to assume that the
danger of error for homicides is as small as
it is for other crimes, or, worse yet, that it
is even smaller. Homicides, especially
capital murders, require more care to
correct miscarriages of justice, and not just
because the consequences are worse, but
also because the risk of error is greater.
When an erroneous conviction is
discovered and the mistake is proven
beyond doubt, we know what to do: stop
the execution, release the prisoner. If there
were some general method for identifying
mistakes, we wouldn't have this problem in
the first place. But of course, there isn't.
Instead, the errors that we have discovered
advertise the existence of others that we've
missed. How often will an innocent
prisoner run into a movie producer who is
struck by his story? What if the real killer
is killed in a car crash, or dies of a drug
overdose, or is never arrested, or never
confesses7 The most the legal system can
do is improve the odds by providing
resources to help discover and prove
errors, by considering serious claims
whenever they are made, and by taking
action even if proof of innocence is not
absolute.
Attention and quality representation
improve an innocent defendant's chances.
They help get court hearings; they increase
visibility, which produces opportunities for
lucky breaks; they buy time during which
the true killer may confess. But these
assets, whatever their value, are unevenly
distributed. For the most part, they are the
special preserve of defendants who have
been sentenced to death and who still face
the possibility of execution. And even for
that restricted group this special attention
is under fire. Executive clemency - the
traditional backstop that was said to
prevent execution "when there is the
slightest doubt of guilt" - has shriveled up
in recent years. It is now too uncommon to
have a major impact on the danger of
executing innocent defendants. That

throws the entire weight of detecting errors
onto the reviewing courts; since the
discovery of errors takes time, the main
burden is on the late/ stages of the process,
and especially habeas corpus review in the
federal court. Recently, resources for post
conviction defense in capital cases have
been cut, the bases for review in federal
court have been limited, and the process of
review has been accelerated. If a defendant
obtains evidence of his innocence late in
the day - after the deadlines for raising
the appropriate legal claims have passed the hurdles to obtaining a hearing, not to
mention relief, are extraordinarily high.
Perhaps these new rules will have little
effect in practice. But if they do, the
direction of change is inevitable: Fewer
mistakes will be caught even among those
cases that remain on track to execution,
more innocent homicide defendants will
remain in prison, and more defendants will
be killed by the state in error.
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